Nextgov/FCW - Authors - Chris Schneidmiller

U.S. Aims to Strengthen WMD Interdiction Program at Warsaw Meeting

Chris Schneidmiller, Global Security Newswire — Fri, 24 May 2013 16:09:20 -0400

A large multinational meeting next week offers an opportunity for new, concrete steps to strengthen a U.S.-led program to catch the illicit movement of weapons of mass destruction, a senior State Department official said.

The high-level political meeting observing the 10^th anniversary of the Proliferation Security Initiative is scheduled for Tuesday in Warsaw, Poland.

Up to three-fourths of the 102 nations that participate in the program are expected to send delegations, said Vann Van Diepen, principal deputy assistant secretary of State for international security and nonproliferation.

“Our expectations are that this meeting is going to review the accomplishments of the past 10 years and then based on those accomplishments come up with near-term additional focus areas and activities for the regime and then also provide strategic direction for future years,” he said in an interview on Wednesday, “and sort of taken together to really sort of increase the political standing of the initiative and the gravitas of its activities.”

A number of nations are likely to offer declarations of specific measures they intend to take to reinforce the effort, according to Van Diepen. These could include hosting workshops and interdiction exercises, as well as fresh outreach intended to draw additional governments into the program.

Delegates might also discuss plans for augmenting their governments' legal authorities and operational capabilities to halt transport of unconventional arms or related materials, the official said.

Longer-term thinking at the meeting would emphasize establishing “more sustainable activities,” added Van Diepen, who will be part of the U.S. team led by acting Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Rose Gottemoeller. He said he could not discuss specifics of that strategic planning, but said results would be distinct from "one-offs" such as a stand-alone drill.

Then-President George W. Bush unveiled the Proliferation Security Initiative a decade ago in Warsaw. Each participating nation agrees to a Statement of Interdiction Principles for nuclear, chemical and other unconventional weapons and materials, in which offer pledges including to “interdict transfers to and from states and nonstate actors of proliferation concern to the extent of their capabilities and legal authorities."

Nations also agree to establish “Critical Capabilities and Practices” that include legal prohibitions on WMD proliferation and the operational capacities to examine, confiscate and manage potentially dangerous goods.

Officials generally do not discuss details of actual interdictions conducted by participant states. Then-Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph said in 2006 that the program had “played a key role in helping to interdict more than 30 shipments,” according to a June 2012 analysis from the Congressional Research Service.

“Whether and to what extent PSI has contributed to these interdictions is unclear; they may have happened even without PSI,” CRS nonproliferation specialist Mary Beth Nikitin wrote. “Moreover, even if the creation of PSI was followed by increased numbers of WMD-related interdictions, the increase may be the product of an upsurge in proliferation activity or improved intelligence.”

Under the Obama administration, news reports have linked the program to a 2011 multilateral effort to prevent suspected North Korean missile technology from reaching Myanmar via a ship sailing under the flag of Belize.

“Obviously I can’t get into details, but I personally participated in cases where it’s very clear that because of the connections that were made via PSI, because of the results of PSI exercises, we have gotten other countries to cooperate in interdictions where prior to the advent of PSI some of those same countries were not as cooperative partners,” Van Diepen said.

President Obama, in his widely touted April 2009 speech in Prague, called for the initiative to become a “durable international institution.”

Between 80 and 90 nations had already signed onto the program when Obama took office in January 2009, Van Diepen said. While the rate of new involvement has slowed, the number capacity-building events -- including exercises in which personnel practice actual interdiction operations -- has remained consistent at roughly 10 each year.

Representative Michael Turner (R-Ohio) and six other House Armed Services Committee members charged in a March letter to the White House that Obama had allowed the initiative to "languish."

Turner was traveling and not available for comment, a spokesman said.

Van Diepen argued that “the size of the subscribership is only one indicator” of success.

“We’ve gone beyond simply trying to build the political awareness and support for interdiction to really tangibly trying to build up the capability of all 102 countries to actually conduct successful interdictions in the real world. It seems to me that’s a very important addition to the repertoire of the initiative,” he said.

Nations are now increasingly initiating interdiction operations and watching for possible proliferation threats, where previously they often needed to be prodded by the United States or another government, Van Diepen said.

While the focus remains on interdictions at sea, where the “great bulk” of cargo is moved, there is also growing attention to movement of suspicious materials by land or air. The building blocks of a strong capacity to halt such transports – such as cargo screening and inspection capabilities and readiness to manage hazardous materials – apply to all three transits routes, he said.

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Q&A: Iran Nuclear Probe Must Advance, IAEA Chief Says

Chris Schneidmiller, Global Security Newswire — Fri, 26 Apr 2013 16:53:33 -0400

The investigation of Iran’s nuclear program must be allowed to take on the real concerns at hand rather than remain stuck going “round in circles” in endless talks, according to the United Nations’ top nuclear official.

The International Atomic Energy Agency since early 2012 has convened nine meetings with Iranian officials aimed at setting the terms for the stalled inquiry. The next session is scheduled for May 15.

In an April 16 written response to a series of questions, IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano said Tehran has yet to prove there are no “military dimensions” to its nuclear program. The United States and other nations are less restrained, asserting Iran is aiming at a nuclear-weapon capability, a charge vehemently denied by Iranian leaders.

“We have had nine rounds of talks on the structured approach document … but we were not able to reach agreement,” Amano stated. “We need to move forward to address substance, not go round in circles discussing process.”

Iran has proven to perhaps be Amano’s biggest headache in nearly four years on the job. It is far from the only one, though. The agency remains frozen out of North Korea, which conducted its third nuclear test earlier this year. Syria has similarly proved unwilling to resolve suspicions about several facilities in its territory, one of which was an alleged nuclear reactor plant bombed by Israel in 2007.

“In all three cases we continue to work towards a successful outcome: the full implementation of IAEA safeguards agreements and resolutions of the Board of Governors and U.N. Security Council,” Amano told Global Security Newswire. “We are not giving up.”

Amano assumed leadership of the Vienna, Austria-based organization in December 2009 after a long diplomatic career that included serving as the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s top arms control official and later as Tokyo’s IAEA delegate.

It took several rounds of polling by the agency’s 35-nation governing board for Amano to defeat South African diplomat Abdul Minty for the top post. Amano was broadly seen as the preferred candidate of Western nations, while Minty had the backing of many developing states.

Those regional tensions have persisted, with Iran complaining of unfair treatment by Amano -- specifically his unwillingness to turn over documents that provide the basis for the agency’s suspicions. Some former IAEA officials have also questioned the agency chief’s approach.

Amano said Iran is held to the same standards as all nations that join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon members. It is up to Iranian leaders to disprove “a substantial body of information” suggesting that it has conducted work that could be used in developing nuclear weapons, he added.

The dispute will almost certainly cross over into Amano’s second term, which is effectively a lock after he received unanimous affirmation from the IAEA board in March. The watchdog's full membership has the final say in September.

In wide-ranging answers to e-mailed questions, Amano discussed the agency’s work to address nuclear proliferation threats, its other duties including promoting peaceful use of atomic technology, criticism of the response to the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant disaster in Japan, and nuclear worries that deserve greater attention.

GSN: Why did you choose to seek a second term as IAEA director general?

Amano: Member states of the IAEA supported me to serve a second term. For my part, I find it a great privilege to serve as IAEA director general. I like the job: it’s challenging and never dull. I appreciate the chance to do some good, to make a difference in the world.

GSN: What do you see as your accomplishments in the last four years, and what do you hope to do going ahead?

Amano: I think I’ve been able to achieve some concrete results in my time so far as director general. We’ve presented the Iran case with clarity, and also drew a conclusion on Syria. I succeeded in convening a forum to discuss nuclear-weapons-free zones in relation to the Middle East, after many years where such a meeting was not possible. The Fukushima Daiichi accident presented many challenges, but the agency’s Action Plan on Nuclear Safety gained unanimous member state support and is driving international efforts to raise safety standards to the highest possible level. We’ve also raised awareness of how nuclear technology can contribute in fields such as cancer control, water management, food and the environment -- issues that affect the lives of people around the world.

The General Conference has still to approve the board’s decision to re-appoint me, so I prefer not to talk in too much detail about my priorities for the next four years. As you know, the agency’s mandate is to enhance the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity around the world, and to help prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. I intend to pursue these multiple objectives in a balanced way, for all member states. And I will deliver concrete results by further improving management.

GSN: You recently noted the difficulty of negotiating with Iran. What makes that nation such a complicated negotiating partner?

Amano: I don’t think it’s for me to comment on Iran as a negotiating partner.

The situation itself has become more complex, in the sense that, for example, Iran is now enriching uranium up to 20 percent. As I’ve said before, it is frustrating that we have produced no concrete results in resolving outstanding issues. We have had nine rounds of talks on the structured approach document, which is a modality to resolve outstanding issues, but we were not able to reach agreement. We need to move forward and address substance, not go round in circles discussing process.

The agency is firmly committed to resolving all outstanding issues through dialogue, and we will continue making every effort to reach agreement with a sense of urgency. But any such approach must allow the agency to do its verification job properly.

GSN: What is the likelihood of reaching an agreement on the scope of the IAEA investigation of Iran’s nuclear program, and for resolving concerns about those activities?

Amano: I don’t want to speculate. As I said, the agency is committed to resolving all the outstanding issues by diplomatic means. It’s in Iran’s own interest to engage fully with the agency to resolve outstanding issues regarding possible military dimensions to its nuclear program.

GSN: How do you respond to Iran’s claim that it has not been treated fairly during your tenure as head of the IAEA? What about its demand for documents believed to have contributed to suspicions about its atomic activities?

Amano: It is quite simple: I believe that all non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT should fully implement comprehensive safeguards agreements and other relevant obligations if there are any. No exception is made to this rule. We don’t hold Iran to different standards.

The fact is that we have a substantial body of information that indicates that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. As things stand, the agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.

Iran needs to engage with us, to clarify the situation. We are ready to present clear, detailed questions to Iran. We are also ready to provide relevant documents, where we consider this appropriate.

GSN: Has the IAEA had any contact with the Kim Jong Un regime in North Korea? Has there been any sign that the government would consider allowing IAEA inspectors back into the country?

Amano: You’ll remember that in March 2012 the D.P.R.K. invited an agency delegation to discuss technical issues relating to the monitoring of a possible moratorium on uranium enrichment activities at Yongbyon, but that this invitation was subsequently discontinued.

Obviously the recent nuclear test, and the announcement that the D.P.R.K. will rebuild and restart nuclear facilities including the 5 [megawatt] reactor at Yongbyon, were steps in the wrong direction. They are deeply regrettable, and in clear violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions.

The IAEA remains ready to contribute to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We are ready to resume our verification activities in the D.P.R.K., as soon as political agreement is reached among the countries concerned. I strongly urge the D.P.R.K. to implement fully all relevant resolutions of the U.N. Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors.

GSN: What is the state of the IAEA probe of Syria? Can you move ahead while the civil war continues?

Amano: We have not received any new information from Syria or other member states that would change the assessment we made in May 2011, that a building destroyed at the Dair Alzour site was very likely to have been a nuclear reactor that should have been declared to the agency. We cannot give any assessment on the nature or operational status of three other locations that are alleged to be functionally related to Dair Alzour.

Although clearly the situation inside the country presents challenges, we are continuing to ask the Syrian government to engage with us to clarify the nature of these activities. We continue to have an interest in gaining access to relevant sites, people and documents.

GSN: The investigations of Iran, North Korea and Syria have all remained unresolved. How do you measure progress in those probes?

Amano: In those three cases, the Board of Governors decided that some of their activities constitute noncompliance with their comprehensive safeguards agreements and reported the cases to the U.N. Security Council. The U.N. Security Council, for its part, adopted resolutions, but none of these countries has implemented such resolutions. Those three cases are all different, and I can’t compare one with another. Nevertheless, in all three cases we continue to work towards a successful outcome: the full implementation of IAEA safeguards agreements and resolutions of the Board of Governors and U.N. Security Council. We are not giving up.

GSN: Are there other nuclear proliferation threats that should be receiving more attention?

Amano: I would say an area that needs more attention in general is the threat that nuclear materials could be put to malicious use by nonstate players -- the issue of nuclear security. The most dangerous country is the country that doesn’t recognize this danger. The agency works closely with member states to support them in addressing this threat, and we will be holding a ministerial-level conference in July aimed at enhancing global nuclear security efforts.

GSN: What other areas of the IAEA’s work deserve more outside attention?

Amano: As I said earlier, the agency’s work is not just about safeguards. We are best known to the public for our work in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, or perhaps in nuclear safety. I’ve also mentioned our important role in nuclear security. But another essential part of our mandate is to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, for the benefit of humanity.

For example, we help to increase food production in dozens of countries through the use of nuclear techniques to develop more robust varieties of crops that thrive in difficult conditions. We work to improve access to clean drinking water and to combat deadly animal diseases such as foot-and-mouth, which can destroy the livelihoods of entire communities.

Cancer control is high on our agenda. Some 70 percent of cancer cases are now diagnosed in developing countries, but most of these countries lack both radiotherapy equipment and properly trained specialists. Hundreds of thousands of people do not have access to treatment that could save their lives. We support projects to train health professionals, strengthen cancer diagnosis, management and treatment, and establish oncology and radiotherapy centers in countries such as Afghanistan, Eritrea and Mozambique.

These are just a few examples, but they give an idea of the huge range of practical benefits that the agency is helping to deliver to people around the world.

GSN: Has the agency identified the perpetrator or perpetrators behind the hacking attemptsreported last year?

Amano: I don’t want to point the finger in any particular direction. We cannot be complacent; any organization can be a target for hacking attempts, and the agency is no exception. We treat information security very seriously, and take all possible measures to protect our computer systems and data from illegal access. Our experts are constantly assessing potential threats and looking for any weakness in our systems.

GSN: Do you believe the agency responded sufficiently quickly and forcefully to the Fukushima Daiichi disaster?

Amano: There are many misconceptions about the agency’s role in a nuclear accident. We are often referred to as the ‘nuclear watchdog’, but this applies only to our verification work. In nuclear safety, responsibility lies with the operators, regulators and member states. We are not an international safety regulator, nor some kind of emergency force.

Within its mandate, the IAEA was active from day one in helping Japan to respond to the emergency, and helping the world to enhance safety.

Our incident and emergency center was fully activated within about an hour of the earthquake, and worked literally round the clock for weeks to gather and disseminate information and coordinate offers of help. We provide solid information that has been validated by the member state itself, and I believe that’s an important reference point, particularly in a fast-moving emergency. I myself went to Japan one week after the accident began, to speak to the government and ask for a better flow of information. I sent expert teams to provide advice and help with radiation monitoring, food safety, and remediation of the consequences of the accident. The agency continues to send missions to Japan to help with challenges such as decommissioning and remediation.

We have learned lessons from the accident, and could do better in various ways if another one occurred. We are also helping to enhance nuclear safety: the member states of the agency endorsed the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety unanimously, and are now implementing it.

GSN: What work is ongoing at the Fukushima site?

Amano: While the IAEA has supported Japan with some guidance, recovery operations at Fukushima Daiichi are conducted by Japanese officials and workers. Those crews are conducting a large set of on-site operations, aimed at resolving short-term concerns and planning long-term actions.

As we have seen from the recent water leakage, and the power outage that caused cooling problems in the spent fuel pools, the situation at the site remains challenging. In the near term, efforts are continuing to cool the damaged reactor cores of Units 1, 2, and 3; to manage on-site water storage and mitigate seawater contamination; and to prepare space in the common spent fuel pool so that fuel can be removed from the Unit 4 spent fuel pool -- an operation scheduled to begin before the end of this year. Looking ahead, officials are planning for the ultimate disassembly of the reactors and the safe disposal of radioactive waste.

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Possible North Korea Nuke Test Emissions Identified

Chris Schneidmiller, Global Security Newswire — Tue, 23 Apr 2013 16:36:16 -0400

An international nuclear nonproliferation organization said on Tuesday it has identified what appear to be radioactive materials released more than two months ago by North Korea’s third nuclear test.

Sensors in Japan and Russia detected the xenon 131m and xenon 133 earlier this month, according to the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization.

“The ratio of the detected xenon isotopes is consistent with a nuclear fission event occurring more than 50 days before the detection (nuclear fission can occur in both nuclear explosions and nuclear energy production),” the Vienna, Austria-based body said in a press release. “This coincides very well with announced nuclear test by the D.P.R.K. that occurred on 12 February 2013, 55 days before the measurement.”

There has been little question that North Korea detonated a nuclear device within an underground chamber at its Punggye-ri installation. State media declared the event, which was instantaneously detected by 94 CTBT seismic sensor sites and two infrasound stations.

Detection of radioactive material was seen as offering definitive proof of the blast. Issue experts had theorized that the absence of such a find suggested the North intentionally sealed the test chamber to prevent material escapes.

The North has now been determined to be a probable origin site for the radioactive noble gases via atmospheric modeling of how weather patterns would move the material, the agency noted.

It said, though, that the conclusion provided no assistance in determining whether Pyongyang detonated a plutonium-based device as in its 2006 and 2009 tests, or if instead it used highly enriched uranium for the first time.

“To be able to distinguish between uranium and plutonium, it helps if a detection is made early (before the decay of isotopes) and the amount of registered radioactivity is large,” according to a CTBTO fact sheet.

"At this stage it is very unlikely that remote sensing is going to provide any clues as to what material the test involved," said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Washington-based Arms Control Association.

Definitive word would probably have to come from North Korea, added Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. "Either they tell us, or ... a little bird overhears them talking about it," he stated by e-mail.

The preparatory commission is charged with fielding and operating hundreds of detection facilities that would use four different sensor technologies to catch breaches of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which has yet to enter into force.

North Korea has not joined the pact and continues to push ahead with its nuclear arms program in the face of overwhelming global opposition. It is the only nation in the last 15 years to conduct explosive atomic trials.

"The latest detection shows again that the CTBT verification regime is very sophisticated and stands ready to provide confidence to states that no nuclear explosion will escape detection," CTBTO spokeswoman Annika Thunborg stated by e-mail.

Thunborg in March said CTBTO officials did not expect to find any radioactive remnants one month after the test.

“Detection of radioactive noble gas more than seven weeks after the event is indeed unusual, we did not expect this and it did not happen” in North Korea’s previous nuclear test more than three years ago, according to the Tuesday CTBTO statement.

Primary detection of xenon occurred on April 8 and 9 in Takasaki, Japan, 620 miles from Punggye-ri, followed by a lower-level identification from April 12 to 14 at Ussuriysk, Russia. Further analysis was necessary before the findings could be announced, the organization said.

Findings suggest an “instantaneous” emission of 1 to 10 percent of the noble gases that would have been left from February, the agency said. It declined to speculate on the cause of the release.

"Sometimes the geology of the test site means that the radiological gases that are produced to not escape to the surface for some time," Kimball said in a telephone interview.

It remains possible that the materials did not originate in North Korea, the treaty organization acknowledged. However, it ruled out Japan’s earthquake-crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant as the source and played down the potential for spoofs.

While it would be feasible for the North to release the radioactive gases without setting off a nuclear device, producing the 4.9-magnitude earthquake that occurred on Feb. 12 with standard explosives would be “technically very challenging” and hard to pull off without being caught, the agency said.

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State Department Awards Website Where Nukes Meet Pop Culture

Chris Schneidmiller, Global Security Newswire — Fri, 15 Mar 2013 17:47:02 -0400

The U.S. government is assisting one student’s mission to use popular culture – from Godzilla to Slim Pickens’ wild bomb ride in Stanley Kubrick’s "Dr. Strangelove" – for spreading information on nuclear weapons policy.

Monterey Institute of International Studies graduate student Lovely Umayam this month won a $5,000 first prize in the State Department’s inaugural Innovation in Arms Control Challenge for her website, Bombshelltoe.com – where “wonk meets pop.”

There’s plenty of pop to go around, starting with an eye-catching home page collage featuring missile warheads, a boy in a “duck and cover” drill, “The Simpsons'’” diabolical power plant owner Mr. Burns, a cartoon duck, Cuban leader Fidel Castro, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu giving his now-famous U.N. “red line” speech on Iran.

Even the website’s name mixes the two topics, combining bombshell with Adidas' classic “shell toe” sneakers.

“I just want to make nuclear policy a little more accessible and fun,” said Umayam, a nonproliferation and terrorism studies student at the California school.

The fun has a serious intent – to explain the intricacies and importance of issues that generally do not capture the public’s attention, she added. So the website also features primers on nuclear weapon-free zones and the benefits and potential pitfalls of using social media in arms control.

The project, the result of about 18 months of work, for now remains in beta mode. Armed with the State money, Umayam intends to provide a glossary of terms and information on nuclear arms history, policy and science. Future articles will discuss Atoms For Peace – President Dwight Eisenhower’s 1953 speech, not the band led by Radiohead’s Thom Yorke – and the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency beyond being a “nuclear watchdog.”

The website has its origins in discussions with “non-nuclear nerd friends,” Umayam said.

“I’d talk to them about nonproliferation issues and they’d always stop me and ask me what certain acronyms mean and why this is even significant to study or care about,” she told Global Security Newswire. “With my debates and conversations with them I realized the general public is really starting with zero knowledge when it comes to nonproliferation.”

“I figured that pop culture would be a great gateway to some Arms Control 101,” the nonproliferation and terrorism studies student said from Beijing, where she is studying Chinese nuclear policy.

An informed populace will be important to meeting the State Department’s goal of using social media to promote arms control transparency, Umayam said.

Foggy Bottom’s top arms control official, Rose Gottemoeller, has given a number of speechestouting the capacity of the citizenry to produce and assess data for use in tracking potential WMD activities.

“There are apps that can convert your smartphone camera into a radiation detector. Your tablet could help detect nuclear explosions,” she said last week during an address the South by Southwest Interactive Festival in Austin, Texas.

Gottemoeller called for participants at the forum to “help us think bigger and bolder” about the marriage of new technology and arms control oversight.

Umayam said she hopes her website can assist in this goal by providing information but alsoconsidering the benefits and potential pitfalls of what she calls “social verification.”

“Social verification entails trusting the common citizen to know what he/she is doing, what he/she [is] detecting/verifying,” Umayam said in Thursday e-mail follow-up to a telephone interview. “That is where Bombshelltoe comes in – it’s a space where the public can learn a little more and start talking about nuclear issues in a more meaningful way. Once the public is educated, then perhaps the next step is to put this knowledge into action.”

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Nuclear Lab Remains Vulnerable to Cyberstrikes, Energy IG says

Chris Schneidmiller, Global Security Newswire — Fri, 15 Feb 2013 16:03:45 -0500

A leading U.S. nuclear arms site has taken significant steps in recent years to defend against strikes on its computer systems, but key weaknesses remain to be fixed, the Energy Department’s inspector general said this week.

The Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico uses a host of information systems and networks to carry out its duties, which include research and production programs in support of maintaining the nation’s nuclear arsenal, Inspector General Gregory Friedman said in a memorandum attached to a cybersecurity report.

“The vulnerabilities in the report do cover national security systems (systems which process classified data),” Felicia Jones, spokeswoman for the DOE Inspector General’s Office, told Global Security Newswire by e-mail. “We cannot comment on whether or not these systems pertained to the lab’s nuclear arms work.”

Friedman’s office in previous audits has found vulnerabilities in Los Alamos’ defenses against computer-based assaults, such as insufficient monitoring at the laboratory and federal levels and key protections that did not work correctly.

“LANL has taken steps to address concerns regarding its cybersecurity program raised in prior evaluations,” Friedman stated. “Our current review, however, identified continuing concerns related to LANL’s implementation of risk management, system security testing and vulnerability management practices.”

Troubles persist in the absence of “effective monitoring and oversight’ of defense operations by the on-site office that oversees Los Alamos for the Energy Department’s National Nuclear Security Administration, according to Friedman. In some cases, the Los Alamos Site Office signed off on “practices that were less rigorous than those required by federal directives.”

Friedman warned that additional adjustments must be made to reduce the threat of breaches to the laboratory’s computer systems.

Among the issues identified in the latest report:

The laboratory has failed to consistently prepare and employ adequate risk management systems, including insufficiently detailed analyses of threats to its computer operations.
Los Alamos personnel have not consistently found effective responses to particularly worrisome weaknesses. Checks by auditors identified five “critical” and 15 “high-risk” weaknesses on four systems that feature national security data.
Computer network servers and systems featured “easily guessed log-in credentials or required no authentication. For example, 15 web applications and five servers were configured with default or blank passwords.”

The Energy Department has been subject to a massive increase in cyberstrikes in recent years, including system breaches and malware infections, the inspector general said in a late 2012 report.The public website for the NNSA Y-12 National Security Complex had to be taken down temporarily after one 2011 attack.

Los Alamos has faced a number of security and safety setbacks in recent years, most recentlyfaulty defense technology in the area that houses production of plutonium cores for nuclear weapons.

“I’m concerned that sensitive data at LANL could be at risk, given the lab's past security scandals and still unresolved cyber security issues,” Jay Coghlan, executive director of the watchdog organization Nuclear Watch New Mexico, stated by e-mail. “After all of the security problems and exploding cost overruns all across NNSA’s nuclear weapons complex, Congress should be mandating strict federal oversight and demanding greater return on taxpayers’ dollars from contractors by requiring them to meet specific performance goals.”

The inspector general’s report calls for improved risk management and continuous monitoring for threats against the laboratory’s computer operations. It also recommends that top NNSA officials fix technical weaknesses cited in the report; make sure the laboratory is meeting federal mandates for threat analysis and other key cyberdefense areas; and “direct LANL to modify internal procedures to include scanning processes designed to identify all vulnerabilities on the national security and unclassified computing environments.”

The nuclear agency said it accepted the recommendations and would make the needed fixes no later than March 30, 2014.

“It should be noted that LANL has taken aggressive measures to develop comprehensive cybersecurity procedures within the last five years,” NNSA Associate Administrator Cindy Lersten stated in a letter to the Inspector General’s Office. “NNSA remains committed to maturing our cybersecurity processes.”

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Airborne nuclear forensics tool being prepared

Chris Schneidmiller, Global Security Newswire — Fri, 25 Jan 2013 16:20:57 -0500

The U.S. Air Force and a major national research laboratory are collaborating to deploy a new airborne tool for identifying the origin of a nuclear bomb after detonation.

The “Harvester” technology would offer a “modular nuclear debris sampling capability” -- pods that could be attached to manned or drone aircraft to collect and identify radioisotopes left behind by an atomic blast.

“Nuclear debris sampling and analysis enables verification that a nuclear explosive event occurred and aids in the national technical nuclear forensics mission requirements,” Susan Romano, spokeswoman for the Air Force Technical Applications Center, this week told Global Security Newswire. “Modularity can enable installation on a range of aircraft, potentially eliminating the need for payload-specific aircraft modifications.”

Nuclear forensics encompasses a range of technical capabilities to determine the start point for material in an atomic device that is seized in transit or actually detonated. That capacity is seen as a deterrent to rogue actors that might otherwise hope to get away with a nuclear attack, and as an asset for directing any U.S. response after an incident.

The U.S. ability to maintain a viable forensics infrastructure has been a point of concern in recent years. An expert panel convened by the National Academies warned in 2010 that “strong leadership, careful planning and additional funds” were needed to overcome troubles with present capabilities, which it said include the absence of a central leadership, insufficient personnel and outdated technology.

The Harvester system could also be a new resource for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty regime, which aims to prevent and identify illicit trial detonations that are seen as key to development of a nuclear arsenal, Romano stated by e-mail.

Research and development on the technology started around 2002, and design on the Harvester system dates to 2008 at the Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico, officials said.

Initial flight-testing occurred in September at Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota.

The system -- two pods for collecting and analyzing nuclear material and a third for guidance -- were placed on a Reaper drone owned by the Homeland Security Department’s Customs and Border Protection branch, Sandia said in a recent release.

The pods successfully gathered and analyzed various radioisotopes found in the atmosphere, suggesting they could do the same for material released by a manmade device.

Following an actual nuclear event, a drone could be directed to the “hot spot” of a post-explosion plume, Sandia said. Radioactive material would adhere to filter paper as the pods are flown through the affected area and then undergo sensor analysis to determine the specific kind and quantity of substance. Further study would be conducted once the filters are collected after the aircraft returns to base.

Sandia is also continuing work on a new Whole Air Sampling Pod, which could be used to gather gas samples at large volume rather than the particles collected by existing pods.

“The gas samples can then be analyzed for gas species of interest for forensics/treaty monitoring, notably short-lived radioxenon produced from a nuclear explosion,” Sandia project chief Joe Sanders stated by e-mail on Thursday.

The Pentagon hopes to try out the Harvester system on a manned aircraft this year, and to take over management of the technology in 2014, Romano stated.

The number of units to be built remains under consideration, she said. Meanwhile, “Harvester product improvement opportunities are being identified for possible future implementation,” the spokeswoman added.

Romano did not release details of costs for the project to date, or anticipated expenses as the Harvester program moves forward.

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NNSA helicopter now on hunt for radiation in Washington, D.C.

Chris Schneidmiller, Global Security Newswire — Fri, 04 Jan 2013 16:12:38 -0500

Data collected by a helicopter flying daily over Washington, D.C., through next week could one day be key to detecting a nuclear or radiological weapon amid the clutter of harmless radioactive sources scattered through the city.

The National Nuclear Security Administration began sending the rotorcraft loaded with radiation-detection equipment over the nation’s capital on Dec. 27 and the flights continue through Jan. 11. The missions ultimately will cover 70 square miles, encompassing the entirety of the District of Columbia and possibly areas of neighboring Northern Virginia.

The agency is a semiautonomous arm of the Energy Department responsible for helping prevent, or respond to, any nuclear or radiological incidents.

A DOE-owned Bell helicopter with two pilots, a scientist and technician is making two flights per day on average, depending on the weather, the official said. Roughly 20 flights are anticipated in total.

The intent is to identify natural emitters of radiation that already exist locally in the event that authorities are forced to hunt for a nuclear weapon, radiological “dirty bomb,” or another radioactive source that is lost or stolen.

“There’s natural radiation in the environment all around us. The pavement emits radiation, and especially in D.C. there’s a lot of granite statues,” an NNSA official told Global Security Newswire. “Granite has natural radium and thorium and other radioactive isotopes. And that emits radiation.”

The individual spoke on condition of anonymity, lacking authorization to comment on the project.

“If they find something, then we can compare it to this background map and say we know that that’s a hot spot because there’s a statue here or there’s this natural feature that happens to be more radioactive than the area around it,” added the official. “It saves time in adjudicating anomalies in directed operations.”

The rotorcraft carries crystal-based technology for finding gamma radiation, which can spread hundreds of feet into the atmosphere.

“It goes back and forth, kind of like mowing the lawn at 150 feet in the air,” the official said of the specially outfitted helicopter.

Analysis of the findings by the NNSA Remote Sensing Laboratory at Joint Base Andrews in Maryland should be completed shortly after the flight program finishes, the source added.

The project is being conducted at the request of local law enforcement, but the official did not know the specific agency.

The Energy Department has conducted hundreds of aerial searches since the 1960s for environmental remediation projects and background radiation checks.

Selected areas of Washington and surrounding jurisdictions in Virginia were previously scanned about five years ago by the nuclear agency. It has conducted corresponding flight operations in New York City, Baltimore and the Bay Area of California, usually at the request of the municipalities, the official said.

The agency has also trained police in cities including Chicago to use their own systems for the same end. Digital maps highlighting natural radioactive hot spots are then produced by NNSA specialists.

In all cases, maps of the findings are submitted to the covered jurisdictions, the agency said.

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Pentagon, NIH fund pollen-based vaccine delivery research

Chris Schneidmiller, Global Security Newswire — Mon, 10 Dec 2012 15:52:07 -0500

The U.S. government in recent months has committed nearly $2 million for research that could one day allow troops in the field to vaccinate themselves against biological warfare threats.

At the core of the Texas Tech University work on improved vaccine delivery is pollen -- the allergy-provoking powder released by flowering plants.

A television commercial provided the spark for the project’s inception three years ago, said lead researcher Harvinder Gill, a chemical engineer who specializes in vaccine and drug delivery at the Lubbock institution.

“I was basically passing by the television and I saw these nicely shaped particles on the TV screen,” he told Global Security Newswire on Friday. “I didn’t know what it was. I just stopped and realized it’s actually an advertisement for an anti-allergy drug to treat pollen allergies.”

Manufacturing synthetic versions of such particles is difficult. Even though the pollens depicted in the commercial “were causing allergies, I wondered if I could use them for a different application, which is to deliver drugs and vaccines into the human body,” Gill said.

Since then, Gill and his colleagues have determined that the allergens within pollen particles can be chemically removed and replaced with a test vaccine. The particles have a hardened shell that would allow the treatment to survive the trip through the stomach and into the intestines to provide protection against infection, Gill said.

The researcher said he believes vaccine-carrying pollens could be delivered via pills or liquids. An oral delivery system offers a number of potential benefits over injections, according to the Pentagon’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.

Rather than requiring shots administered by medical professionals, pills could simply be easily swallowed without pain or hassle even in far-off deployment spots. The drugs could also be more easily shipped to troops in the field than liquid vaccines, the agency said in a Nov. 27press release announcing Gill as a recipient of a DARPA Young Faculty Award.

“Soldiers could really carry them with them or it could be para-dropped in different locations,” Gill said. “Those are just advantages … the armed forces could envision getting.”

The benefits might also extend to the civilian population, he added. “It is child-friendly, patient-friendly. A lot of disadvantages of vaccinations go away suddenly,” Gill said.

The Defense Department office provided Gill’s team with $300,000. In September, the researchers received $1.5 million over five years from the National Institutes of Health to continue the project.

The Pentagon office said an orally delivered vaccine could be used against any number of diseases but did not offer specifics. The agency did not respond to requests for further information on its funding of Gill’s work.

“By using different combinations of pollens we might be in a position to deliver most vaccines,” according to Gill.

Unlike a vaccine administered by injection, a treatment that is ingested could increase mucous membrane immunity in the lungs and intestines, preventing infection from starting in those key bodily systems and then spreading. The test vaccine carried by pollen particles showed “fantastic” results in producing disease-fighting antibodies in test mice, Gill said.

Texas Tech has submitted an application for one patent related to the research and intends to seek another, according to a university press release.

Gill acknowledged that it would require years of research and testing before the work leads to a product that might be available to the military or civilians.

“We want to understand how it’s working,” he said. “We basically tried it and it worked. We need to now understand how the immune response is working.”

(Image via Neung Stocker Photography/Shutterstock.com)

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